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Summary  
 
This review summarises a survey of about 70 empirical studies on proposed African monetary 
unions published during the past fifteen years. Four main strands are outlined in four tables. 
They  include the:  (i) West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), (ii) East African Monetary 
Union (EAMU), (iii) Southern African Monetary Union (SAMU) and (iv) African Monetary 
Union (AMU). A number of concerns are apparent from the feasibility and/or desirability of 
potential monetary unions. They are variations in:  empirical strategies, selection of variables, 
considered periodicities and sampled countries. The Hegelian dialectics are used to establish 
selective expansion as the predominant mode of monetary integration. Some studies make the 
case for strong institutions and pegs as alternatives to currency unions. The employment of 
cluster analysis, distinguishing shocks from responses in the examination of business cycle 
synchronisation and the disaggregation of panels into sub-samples provide more subtle policy 
implications.  
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1. Introduction  
This is a summary of a survey on the feasibility of potential monetary unions in Africa. While 
much of the literature has focused on the viability of proposed monetary zones and existing 
regional economic blocks in the continent, the studies are characterised by different 
periodicities, proxy indicators, different countries and estimation approaches. Moreover, the 
empirical results are conflicting. It is also important to note that such diverse findings are 
contingent on the scope of inquiry, notably, the: West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), East 
African   Monetary Union (EAMU), Southern African Monetary Union (SAMU) and African 
Monetary Union (AMU). This survey aims to structure the above strands in order to provide 
policy makers with the much needed guidance on their choices regarding the feasibility of the 
embryonic monetary zones.  
 The above objective is achieved by using Hegelian dialectics, namely:  (i) a thesis for 
feasibility, (ii) an anti-thesis when studies do not establish feasibility; (iii) a synthesis when 
conditional feasibility is apparent and (iv) justifications for the first-three scenarios. Within 
this framework, each potential monetary union under consideration is assessed in the light of 
four principal views with each relaying relevant monetary policy implications. First, for a 
potential monetary union to be achievable: (i) it should be designed to be robust to a plethora 
of macroeconomic shocks and (ii) member states should be converging towards some 
established criteria. Second, in order for the proposed monetary zone to be impractical, the 
observation should be the opposite criteria used to assess and establish feasibility. Third, 
contingent on certain factors, an embryonic monetary zone could both be feasible and 
unfeasible. Under this scenario, the potential monetary union is feasible if some policies are 
implemented in due course. Fourth, in order to inform policy, we also provide insights into 
why the underlying conclusions are established.  
 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to put some structure in existing 
literature on the proposed African monetary zones. We review inquiries that have examined 
the underlying concern during the period 1964-2010 and largely published during the last 
fifteen years. This appraisal is timely and the relevant findings are not exclusively limited to 
policy makers focusing on Africa, but could as well be used in steering decisions in other 
comparative economies in Asia and Latin America harbouring similar intensions for currency 
unions.   
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2. Summary of survey  
 
Table 1: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Ogunkola (2005) 1970-1997 ECOWAS A RER variability 
model 
Yes  Growing RER convergence  
Debrun et al. (2005) 
 
1996-2000 ECOWAS A calibration model No Presence of fiscal 
heterogeneity  
Bénassy-Quéré & 
Coupet (2005) 
1986-1999 17 Sub-Saharan African 
countries(CAEMC, 
WAEMU, WAMZ and 
ECOWAS) 
Clustering analysis Yes/No Yes with Gambia, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone  
Diop (2012) 1997-2004 ECOWAS Gravity model Yes  Substantial gains in trade 
Tsangarides & Qureshi 
(2008) 
1990-2004 ECOWAS  Clustering analysis No Dissimilar economic 
characteristics between 
WAMZ and WAEMU 
Bangaké (2008) 1990-2003 21 African countries  system of 
simultaneous 
equations and GMM 
Yes/No Yes with Ghana, No with 
Nigeria 
Houssa (2008) 1966-2000 ECOWAS VAR No Asymmetry of supply 
shocks 
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  ECOWAS Welfare gain analysis Yes/No Selective expansion 
Cham (2009). 1980-2005 ECOWAS Exploratory 
convergence criteria  
No Significant absence of 
convergence  
Alagidede et al.  (2012) 1961-2010 Gambia, Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone  
Fractional integration 
and cointegration  
No  Heterogeneity in inflation 
and economic trends 
Chuku (2012) 1970-2010 ECOWAS Symmetry and/or 
asymmetry of 
responses to 
macroeconomic 
shocks.  
No Costs (asymmetry) outweigh 
benefits (symmetry of 
shock). 
Ekpoh & Udoh (2013) 2005-2010 ECOWAS Exploratory 
convergence criteria. 
Yes/No Yes, but at the price of 
monetary policy. 
ineffectiveness is boosting 
output.  
Coulibaly & 
Gnimassoun (2013) 
1985-2009 ECOWAS  Convergence and co-
movements between 
exchange rate 
misalignments. 
Yes/No  The WAEMU could be 
joined by Ghana and 
Gambia.  
Dufrénot & Sugimoto 
(2013) 
1999-2008 ECOWAS Counterfactual 
analyses and 
simulations.  
No  Simulations show little 
support for a dominant peg.  
Asongu (2013b) 1980-2010 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
Granger causality  No Non-traditional monetary 
policy instruments.  
Asongu (2014a) 1980-2009 The Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone 
Cointergration and 
VECM 
Yes/No Evidence of cointegration 
but with dissimilar nexus of 
fundamental with the 
equilibrium.   
Asongu (2014b) 1981-2009 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
GMM No Lack of real, monetary and 
fiscal policy convergence. 
Asongu (2014c) 1980-2010 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
VAR No Ineffective monetary 
policies.   
Saka et al. (2015) 2000-2008 ECOWAS Panel least squares 
and beta convergence.  
Yes/No Evidence of income 
convergence but more 
integration is needed.  
Harvey & Cushing 
(2015) 
1987-2011 Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone 
Structural VAR, 
impulse-response and 
variance 
decomposition.  
No Uncommon sources of 
shocks and asymmetric 
responses to common 
shocks. 
      
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States. RER: Real Exchange Rate. CAEMC: Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community. WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union. GMM: Generalised Method of Moments. VECM: Vector Error 
Correction Model. VAR: Vector autoregression. Source: Asongu et al. (2016).  
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Table 2: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed East African Monetary Union 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Mkenda (2001) 1980-1998 Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda  
Generalized Purchasing Power 
Parity (GPPP) model. 
Yes Cointegrated real exchange 
rates between member states. 
Buigut & Valev 
(2005) 
1970-2001 Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Burundi, 
Rwanda (EAC)  
Structural vector autoregressive 
analysis.  
No  Asymmetric demand and 
supply shocks.  
Yes, with 
more 
integration 
Similar speed and magnitude 
in adjustment of shocks.  
Bangaké 
(2008) 
1990-2003 21 African countries  System of simultaneous 
equations and GMM. 
Yes Yes for Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda (structural 
similarities). 
Buigut & Valev 
(2009) 
1990-2004 EAC Simulation of welfare effects 
from a monetary union 
Not definite  Mutual restraint in monetary 
policy is a potential benefit. 
Falagiarda 
(2010) 
1990-2006 EAC Cointegration analysis.  Yes/No Single currency viable but 
currently doubtful. 
Buigut (2011) 1997-2008 EAC Cointegration techniques on 
exchange rates and monetary 
base. 
No Only partial convergence. 
Kishor & Ssozi 
(2011) 
1970-2007 EAC Unobserved component model 
and time-varying parameter 
model. 
Yes/No Increased but weak business 
cycle synchronisation since 
2000. 
Sheik et al. 
(2011) 
1980-2010 EAC  Cross country correlation and 
variance analysis. 
Yes/No Similar business patterns, 
but for Rwanda.  
Rusuhuzwa & 
Masson (2012) 
1990-2010 EAC Correlation and cointegration 
of business cycle and shocks. 
No Substantial asymmetric 
shocks and production 
structures.  
Davoodi et al. 
(2013) 
2000-2010 EAC Structural vector auto-
regression analysis (SVAR)  
No Weak Monetary Policy 
Transmission Mechanism.  
Asongu 
(2013b) 
1980-2010 EAC Granger causality.  Yes Traditional monetary policy 
instruments.  
Mafusire  & 
Brixiova 
(2013) 
1980-2009 EAC  SVAR No Lack of macroeconomic 
convergence.  
Lepetit et al. 
(2014) 
2003-2010 EAC Stylised model of 
policymakers' decision 
problem  
No  Uncertainty does not allow 
for monetary and financial 
stability.  
Asongu 
(2014b) 
1981-2009 EAC GMM No Lack of real, monetary and 
fiscal policy convergence. 
Asongu 
(2014c) 
1980-2010 EAC VAR No Ineffective  
Monetary policies.   
      
Notes. VAR: Vector autoregressions. GMM: Generalised Method of Moments. Source: Asongu et al. (2016).  
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Table 3: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed Southern African Monetary Union 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Grandes (2003) 
 
1990-2001 Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland , 
South Africa 
Cointegration and 
cost/benefit analysis. 
Yes Common long-run trends.  
Khamfula & Huizinga 
(2004)  
1980-1996 SADC GARCH Model to 
assess disturbances in 
RER.  
Yes/No 
 
Yes for South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. 
Khamfula & Mensteab 
(2004). 
1995-1999 SAMU (Southern 
African Monetary 
Union) 
Cost and Benefit 
analysis.  
Not definite  Structural adjustment 
policies are needed to 
enhance integration 
needed for the SAMU. 
Jefferis (2007) 1990-2002 SADC Macroeconomic and 
monetary convergence. 
Yes/No Selective expansion. 
Wang et al. (2007) 1980-2005 CMA Integration, 
convergence, shock and 
adjustment analyses. 
Yes/No Evidence of integration 
but more symmetric 
responses to shocks are 
needed. 
Bangaké (2008) 1990-2003 21 African countries  System of simultaneous 
equations and GMM. 
Yes/No Yes for Malawi, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.  
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  SADC Welfare gain analysis. Yes/No Selective expansion. 
Agdeyegbe (2009) 1992-2000 SADC  Estimating time-varying 
convergence 
parameters.  
No  Non convergence in 
exchange rate and 
inflation.  
Debrun & Masson 
(2013) 
1994-2010 SADC Welfare gain analysis. Yes  Most members would 
benefit. 
Zehirun et al. (2015) 
 
1995-2012 11 SADC member 
countries  
Cointegration and 
VECM. 
Yes, without 
Angola and 
Mauritius.  
Generalised Purchasing 
Power Parity (GPPP) 
hypothesis holds.  
      
Notes. SADC: Southern African Development Community. CMA: Common Monetary Area. GARCH: Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity. RER: Real Exchange Rate. Source: Asongu et al. (2016).  
 
 
Table 4: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed African Monetary Union 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Bayoumi & Ostry 
(1997) 
1964-1993 Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). 
Analysis of size and 
correlations of real 
disturbance.  
No Low levels of intra-
regional trade. 
Guillaume & Stasavage 
(2000) 
1960-1994 SSA Exploratory politico-
economic analysis.  
Yes Could lead to better 
policies. 
 1960-2000 53 African countries  Analysis of historical 
data. 
Yes/No Yes for three blocks. No 
for Africa. 
Buigut (2006) 1990-2002 EAC and SADC Cluster analysis based 
on real and monetary 
convergence.  
Yes/No  
Selective expansion.  
Buigut & Valev (2006) 1970-2002 21 Eastern and 
Southern African 
countries 
VAR technique for 
synchronising demand 
and supply disturbances.  
Yes/No  
Three clusters are feasible 
for monetary unions. 
Tsangarides et al. 
(2006) 
1948-2002 49 African countries  Tobit model. Yes Substantial trade benefits. 
Masson (2006) 1995-2000  Africa Welfare gain analysis. Yes/No Selective expansion 
Karras (2007) 1960-2000 37 African countries  Cost/Benefit analysis.  No Very heterogeneous 
benefits. 
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  AMU, COMESA, 
ECCAS, ECOWAS, 
SADC. 
Welfare gain analysis. Yes/No  
Selective expansion. 
Debrun et al. (2011) 1990-2008 ECOWAS, EAC and 
SADC 
Cost and benefit analysis 
of monetary integration  
Yes/No Selective clustering in 
regions. 
Tsangarides & Qureshi 
(2015) 
1972-2006 Africa Augmented gravity 
model. 
Yes/No Conventional pegs may be 
better. 
      
Notes. SADC: Southern African Development Community. EAC: East African Community. ECOWAS: Economic Community of West 
African States. AMU: African Monetary Union. COMESA:  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. ECCAS: Economic 
Community of Central African States. Source: Asongu et al. (2016).  
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3. Conclusion  
We have presented a summary of  articles that have focused on potential African monetary 
zones in order to put some structure on the empirical literature and draw some relevant 
lessons for both policymakers and academics. From a broad observation, we have noted that 
in addition to differences in empirical strategies, considered periodicities and sampled nations, 
there is an apparent concern with the establishment of the feasibility and/or desirability of the 
potential monetary zones. In the light of this ambiguity, three scenarios have been employed 
to develop the survey, namely: feasibility (or yes), unfeasibility (or no) and conditional 
feasibility/unfeasibility (yes/no). Moreover, these scenarios have been adapted to the Hegelian 
dialectics (thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis) in various discourses.  
 Irrespective of monetary unions, the most recurrent position from findings is a 
selective procedure of monetary integration. It is relevant to briefly highlight some nations 
that could be left-out through direct disqualification of some countries and/or identification of 
clusters. The following observations are noteworthy.  (i) Nigeria’s membership in the West 
African Monetary Union has been consistently questioned. (ii) Burundi and Rwanda are 
excluded from the East African Community depending on whether the sample is old or new. 
(iii) In the Southern African Monetary Union, joining the Common Market Area (CMA) by 
members of the South African Development Community (SADC) is beneficial to all, with the 
exception of Mauritius, Tanzania and Angola. A SADC-wide symmetric currency area 
continues to be beneficial without Mauritius.  Furthermore, the main convergence group in the 
CMA encompasses Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia and Lesotho, including Tanzania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique and Botswana. Conversely, the non-converging group entails 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. (iv) Selective 
expansion is viewed as the most plausible roadmap to the feasibility of a continental monetary 
union. 
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